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Monetary sovereignty during the classical gold standard era: the Ottoman 
Empire and Europe, 1880-1913* 
Coşkun Tunçer** 
 
ABSTRACT 
The classical gold standard, which prevailed from the 1870s to the First World 
War, was characterised by fixed exchange rates, free convertibility and perfect capital 
mobility and was considered the dominant international monetary system of the time. 
As trilemma hypothesis suggests, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed fixed exchange rates and 
foreign capital flows under the golden rule, but lost its monetary sovereignty. However, 
the extent of this loss was far more apparent than in other core and peripheral 
countries. As a result, the gold standard in the Ottoman Empire was characterised by a 
set of “anomalies” such as the existence of competing monetary authorities, persistence 
of territorial exchange rates and monetary zones and widely circulating multiple 
standard and sub-standard coins. This paper analyses these unique features as changing 
degrees of monetary sovereignty under the golden rule and revisits the evidence. By 
relying on a new dataset, it compares the Ottoman case with major core and peripheral 
countries of Europe in 1880-1913. It explores the hypothesis that ability of the gold 
standard countries to determine the composition and size of the monetary base was not 
homogenous. The paper suggests that the differences in monetary sovereignty for the 
period can best be explained by differences in monetary institutions regulating the 
relationship between governments and central issue banks. This in return offers a 
framework explaining the wide variations across peripheries. 
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Anomaly appears only against the background provided by the paradigm. 
T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962. 
 
This study explores the question of whether membership to a fixed-exchange rate club 
implies differences in monetary sovereignty, which has once again raised extensive debate 
among economists and policy-makers in light of the recent crisis. The literature has often 
underlined the well-known advantages of being a member of a fixed-exchange rate club or a 
monetary union (i.e. the extreme case of fixed-exchange rate systems). However, each 
member’s inability to determine the size and composition of its monetary base in response to 
macroeconomic imbalances and other shocks (i.e. its monetary sovereignty) remain a recurrent 
disadvantage. This reflects the macroeconomic trilemma hypothesis that a nation can maintain 
no more than two of three conditions: fixed exchange rate; free capital flows (i.e. unlimited 
convertibility of its currency and foreign currencies); and monetary sovereignty. This argument 
has been studied extensively in pre-1914 gold standard context, where free capital mobility and 
fixed exchange rates prevailed but monetary sovereignty had to be sacrificed.1   
Although many have written case studies on the gold standard experiences of major 
core and peripheral countries of the time, few are concerned with the way in which the pre-
1914 gold standard functioned in the Ottoman Empire. The following sections aim to fill this 
gap by bringing together wide-ranging quantitative and qualitative evidence on Ottoman 
monetary activities. This scrutiny of the way that the monetary system in the Ottoman Empire 
worked is relevant not only because of its important role in the region’s economy but also as 
one of the biggest capital importers of the time, which makes it interesting to explore in terms 
of trilemma hypothesis.2 More importantly, the “anomalies” of the Ottoman gold standard may 
help us to revise our understanding of European gold standard. Therefore, the second 
contribution of the paper is the quantitative analysis, with a new dataset, of the monetary 
activities of major European countries and the Ottoman Empire, which broadens our 
understanding of differing degrees of monetary sovereignty before the First World War.    
                                                          
1 M. Obstfeld et al., “The trilemma in history: trade-offs among exchange rates, monetary policies and 
capital mobility”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 87, No. 3, 2005, pp.423-438. 
2 The Ottoman Empire contracted its first foreign loan in 1854 and declared a moratorium in 1876 on an 
outstanding debt of £200 million. As a result, in 1881, the government had to abandon a significant 
portion of its revenues to an international financial commission administered by foreign creditors. 
Therefore an analysis of the Ottoman gold standard is also helpful for revisiting the argument that the 
gold standard facilitated the access of peripheral countries to international capital markets. This question 
is explored in detail in A.C. Tuncer, Fiscal autonomy, monetary regime and sovereign risk: foreign 
borrowing and international financial control in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Egypt during the 
classical gold standard era, PhD thesis, LSE, 2011.  
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The paper is organised as follows. The first section briefly reviews the broader literature 
on the pre-1914 gold standard. More specifically, it discusses conventional and revisionist 
perspectives on the “rules of the game” with reference to monetary sovereignty. Section 2 
provides a brief monetary history of the Ottoman Empire during the classical gold standard 
period, moving from the orthodox classifications of the Ottoman Empire as a “gold standard” 
country to the “unique” features of its monetary institutions. Section 3 puts the Ottoman case 
into the European context by introducing a new time series-cross section (TSCS) dataset on 
monetary activities in the major core and peripheral countries of the time. The purpose of the 
quantitative analysis is to determine and explain the varying degrees of monetary sovereignty 
between 1880 and 1913 across countries with a panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) model. 
Finally, section 4 summarises the main argument and identifies the broader implications of the 
findings. 
 
1. Gold standard, peripheries and monetary sovereignty 
Standard interpretations of the pre-1914 gold standard suggest that major countries on 
gold committed themselves to follow the “rules of the game”, enabling the system to work 
“automatically” and ensuring the stability of prices and balance in international payments.3 
However, this stereotype of the gold standard’s functioning is questioned in the literature. For 
instance, as early as the 1960s, Bloomfield emphasised that the “structure of the pre-1914 gold 
standard was far from simple” and showed significant differences in the institutions and 
working of the system between countries.4 To address these differences, given the relative ease 
of finding parallels in such core countries as Britain, Germany and France, revisionist writers 
prefer the ex-post term “periphery” for remaining/outlier countries, where different 
combinations of limping standard, gold-exchange standard, bimetallism, convertible and 
inconvertible paper standards and even silver standard prevailed in the period. Such writers 
underline the asymmetry of the adjustment in core and periphery and its tendency to work pro-
cyclically. Moreover, core and periphery took different routes to the gold standard, put different 
policy instruments at the disposal of monetary authorities and were not equally able to apply (or 
violate) the rules of the game. Other characteristics, such as credibility and easy access to 
                                                          
3 The origin of this account can be extended back to David Hume, “Of the balance of trade” in The Gold 
Standard in Theory and History, ed.by B. Eichengreen and M. Flandreau (New York, 1997). B. 
Eichengreen, Golden Fetters – The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919-1939 (New York, 
1992). 
4 A. I. Bloomfield, Short-Term Capital Movements under the Pre-1914 Gold Standard (Princeton, N.J., 
1963), p.10 and see also A. I. Bloomfield, Monetary Policy under the International Gold Standard: 1880-
1914 (New York, 1959). 
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international capital markets are also noted as distinguishing factors.5 
Although core-periphery framework proved useful for indicating asymmetries in the pre-
1914 monetary order, increasing numbers of case studies also point out that the periphery of 
the gold standard showed marked variation in their linkages with the core of the system, their 
openness and accessibility to international capital markets and other monetary aspects. In 
response to this increasing empirical counter-evidence, some studies underline the importance 
of transcending such frameworks. Eichengreen and Flandreau explain distinct transition routes 
to the gold standard before the First World War, where several cores –London, Paris and Berlin– 
correspond to several peripheries.6  Cohen, however, seeking to construct the “monetary 
geography” from a political economy perspective, suggests that currency domains are defined 
by the extent of their effectiveness. His analysis shifts the focus from political units of analysis 
(i.e. countries) to monetary borders and supply-demand behaviours by global actors.7 Similarly, 
Flandreau and Jobst have recently proposed variation in the international circulation of national 
currencies as a criterion in mapping the geography of the international monetary order before 
1914.8  
This paper emphasises another dimension of peripheries by drawing on the anomalies of 
the Ottoman case and the trilemma hypothesis. Although it is generally accepted that the pre-
1914 gold standard implied losing monetary sovereignty because of free capital flows and fixed 
exchange rates, few studies analyse the extent of this loss. Moreover, one may argue that the 
varying degrees of monetary sovereignty under the gold standard regime indicate differences 
among peripheries and in the hierarchy of the international monetary order.  
The question then is what may best indicate the varying degrees of monetary 
sovereignty across countries. In this paper, the commodity-fiat currency composition of money 
stock is a suggested measure for quantifying this relationship, assuming that a faster transition 
                                                          
5 P. M. Aceña and J. Reis, Monetary Standards in the Periphery – Paper, Silver and Gold 1854-1933 (New 
York, 2000); B. J. Eichengreen and M. Flandreau, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, (New York, 
1997); L. Catao and S. Solomou, “Exchange rates in the periphery and international adjustment under 
the gold standard”, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/41, 2003; M. Morys, “Adjustment under the classical 
gold standard (1870s-1914): how costly did the external constraint come to the European periphery?”, 
Oxford University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, No. 353, 2007. B. Eichengreen and 
M. Flandreau, “The geography of the gold standard”, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1050, 1994, p.2. 
Aceña and Reis, 2000; R. P. Esteves, J. Reis and F. Ferramosca “Market Integration in the Golden 
Periphery. The Lisbon/London Exchange, 1854-1891”, Explorations in Economic History 46, no. 3 (2009), 
pp. 324-345. M.  Flandreau and J. Komlos “Core or Periphery? The Credibility of the Austro-Hungarian 
Currency 1867-1913”, Journal of European Economic History 31, no. 2 (2002), pp. 293-320. 
6 Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1994, p.12. 
7 B. J. Cohen, The Geography of Money (New York, 1998), p.21-22. 
8 M. Flandreau and C. Jobst, “The Ties That Divide: A Network Analysis of the International Monetary 
System, 1890-1910” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 977-1007. 
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to “fiat money”9 gave governments more flexibility to manipulate money supply; contrastingly, 
in countries dominated by commodity money, the money supply was driven more by the money 
demand of economic actors. Earlier writers were also more inclined to emphasise that 
differences amongst peripheries were closely linked with the different types of currency in 
circulation. Triffin argued that the central banks of issue in peripheral countries suffered extra 
pressure because much of the domestic monetary circulation was itself in the form of 
commodity money and not credit money.10 Expansionary monetary policies were thus 
accompanied by outflows of gold and silver from banks’ reserves to internal circulation. This 
movement of specie to internal circulation was all the more pronounced, because the lowest 
denomination of paper currency was usually much too high –often several times greater than a 
month’s wages –to be usable in household and wage payments. Note expansion was therefore 
limited not only by foreign deficits and gold losses, but also by internal gold and silver losses, 
given that banks of issue did not have access to gold or silver “lenders of resort”.11  
Therefore the pre-1914 gold standard can be interpreted as the emergence of fiat 
money and declining importance of commodity monies, which did not take place to the same 
extent across core and peripheries. Besides macroeconomic conditions, the ability of a country 
to introduce fiat money and its “forced circulation”12 (cours forcé) was also determined by its 
monetary institutions regulating the relationship between governments and central banks of 
issue.13 Some states relied exclusively on private banks of issue, while others monopolised this 
power. Some issue banks were state organisations and others were private banks. For some 
private banks, issuing notes was a minor activity, whereas others were designed primarily to do 
so. In many countries state notes and private bank notes circulated together. The following 
sections, inter alia, therefore, aim to quantify and explain the varying degrees of commodity-fiat 
money across the major European gold standard countries. However, to begin the discussion 
first, we first introduce the Ottoman case in detail.  
 
                                                          
9 By “fiat/credit money” we mean bank notes or state notes either backed or unbacked by the issuing 
authority. 
10 R. Triffin, The Evolution of the International Monetary System: Historical Reappraisal and Future 
Perspectives (Princeton, N.J., 1964).  
11 “One might well wonder, indeed, whether the unprecedented stability of major currencies in terms of 
gold –and exchange rates- in the nineteenth century was not due to the spectacular growth of bank 
money or “credit money” –in the form of paper currency and bank deposits –rather than to the residual 
and fast declining, role of gold and silver commodity money”. Triffin, 1964, p.14.  
12 Here we rely on the conceptual difference between legal tender (cours légal) and forced tender (cours 
forcé) as suggested by the contemporary literature. The former refers to the legal receivability of a 
currency for taxes and public dues, the latter to the forced circulation of irredeemable paper money. M. 
Rollins, Money and Investment (London, 1907). 
13 In the paper, the terms “central bank”, “central bank of issue” and “the bank of issue” are used 
interchangeably. These terms refer the monopoly power of a private bank to issue notes and are not 
linked to the modern meaning of the term “central bank”.  
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2. The Ottoman monetary system and institutions, 1880-1913 
In many ways the nineteenth-century evolution of Ottoman monetary institutions 
broadly followed that of the international monetary system, although the implementation of 
international rules and practices occurred in a relatively distinct way. As early as 1844, the 
Ottoman Empire established a new bimetallic system and abandoned debasements (see Table 
1).14 During this period, although no private banks of issue existed, the government started 
experimenting with paper currency. In 1863, British and French capital founded the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank (IOB) to which the government granted the privilege of issuing paper currency. 
During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, this privilege was suspended and the government 
issued its own unbacked state notes. In 1880, the privileges of the IOB were restored, and state 
notes were withdrawn from circulation. Moreover, the government recognized the gold lira as 
legal tender and limited the minting of silver coinage, thus adopting the “limping standard”.15 
Below, we look more closely at these major turning-points in nineteenth century Ottoman 
monetary history from the perspective of evolving monetary institutions or more specifically of 
currency-issuing authorities. 
2.1. Commodity money: from bimetallism to limping standard  
Starting with “coinage adjustment” reform (tashih-i sikke) of 1844, the Ottoman 
government formally declared bimetallism with a fixed gold-silver ratio and abandoned raising 
fiscal revenue through debasements. However, from 1876 onwards, as the depreciation of silver 
in the world markets accelerated, it became increasingly difficult to sustain this gold-silver ratio, 
and the government, like many other European governments, moved away from bimetallism. 
According to the new regulation, from March 1880, the empire’s monetary standard was to be 
the gold lira of 100 kuruş. However, unlike a “full” gold standard country, the mint steadfastly 
accepted the silver at reduced rates. The mint ratio, with a 5 per cent increase over the previous 
bimetallic ratio of 15.09, now stood at 15.88 (see Table 2).16 In other words, the Ottoman 
government moved towards a limping standard by maintaining a gold-silver ratio. As in the 
other limping standard countries, this led to a duality: the Ottoman economy continued to rely 
heavily on silver for most daily domestic transactions and gold was mostly used for international 
                                                          
14 Ş. Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge, 2000). 
15 Ş. Pamuk, “From bimetallism to the ‘limping standard’: the Ottoman monetary system in the 
nineteenth century”, in P. L. Cotrell (ed.) East Meets West – Banking, Commerce and Investment in the 
Ottoman Empire, 2008; K. Dimitrova, L. Fantacci and A. C. Tunçer, “Monetary policy in Southeast Europe 
in transition from bimetallism to limping gold standard”, paper presented at the 5th Conference of 
SEEMHN (Istanbul, 2010) 
16 H. A. Kuyucak, Para ve Banka, (Istanbul, 1947); G. Young, Corps De Droit Ottoman, Vol. 5 (Oxford, 
1905); J. Schneider, O. Schwarzer and F. Zellfelder, Wahrungen der Welt 8 – Afrikanische und 
Levantinische Devisenkurse im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert, (Stuttgart, 1994).  
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transactions.17 In Istanbul, the financial and commercial centre of the empire, the value of the 
British pound generally fluctuated between 1.09 and 1.11 liras and the exchange rates of most 
other major currencies remained stable until 1914. Similarly, the gold-silver price ratio hovered 
around the official rate, despite the heavy depreciation of silver in international markets.18  
However, in its stability the capital city was an exception rather than the rule, unlike 
conditions elsewhere in the empire. Table 3 summarises the average market exchange rate 
between silver kuruş and gold lira in selected years from 1883 to 1914 for major Ottoman 
provinces. It could be argued that the premium for gold over silver usually increased with the 
distance from Istanbul, depending on transportation costs.19 However, there were also extreme 
exchange rate differences between and within provinces, which are hard to explain by distance 
alone.20 The Ottoman government and local authorities were aware of these extreme 
differences. For instance, specifically for Baghdad in 1888, the Ottoman government to give an 
impetus to the import trade devalued the coins in circulation by about one-third. In August 
1889, the Porte proposed a similar devaluation to the local administration of Basra. However, 
Basra refused to comply to avoid negative impact on local trade. The Porte generally admitted 
such exceptions to satisfy the local authorities, given that international trade opportunities and 
linkages varied across provinces. Finally, the common media of exchange differed widely 
between provinces. Gold coins were not circulated in Beirut and Izmir, where silver mecidiye 
dominated. In Syria and Palestine, the coins in widest circulation were the undervalued silver 
beşlik and altılık; in Basra, the Persian keran was the principal coin in use; in Hejaz and Yemen, 
Austrian thaler (Maria Theresa thaler); in Trabzon, Russian roubles; while in Jerusalem, Antalya, 
Inebolu and Zonguldak, French francs and British pounds had replaced Ottoman currency.21   
These different territorial currency zones and exchange rate idiosyncrasies were the 
“anomalies” of the Ottoman gold standard. They survived for several reasons. To start with, 
widespread counterfeiting, beyond government control, affected the differences in exchange 
rates.22 Moreover, the scarcity of fractional coins and small change determined local demand for 
standard and sub-standard silver coins. This shortage made low-denomination silver coins 
circulate at a premium, regardless of the international price of silver. This was why the 
                                                          
17 H. P. Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union, (Chicago, 1901); L. Einaudi, Money and Politics – 
European Monetary Unification and the International Gold Standard (1865-1873), (Oxford, 2001).  
18 Tuncer, 2011; Dimitrova, Fantacci and Tuncer, 2010. 
19 Pamuk 2008, p.21.  
20 For instance, in Izmir the value of the Ottoman lira varied between 102 and 178 kuruş, depending on 
the type of transaction. For the payment of taxes, salaries and other operations of the administration 1 
lira accounted for 102 kuruş, whereas for bills of exchange it was 125 kuruş and finally in the spot 
market it was rated at 178 kuruş. Young, 1905, p.2.  
21 V. Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları (1970, Istanbul); Kuyucak, 1947, p.202; Tuncer 2011; Young, 1905.  
22 Pamuk, 2008.  
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government increased the amount of low-denomination silver coinage, in particular after 1895 
(see Chart 1).  
Moreover, the broad transactional network also determined the demand for a specific 
currency. As in Beirut, the region’s international trade conditions conditioned the choice of 
currency and exchange rate disparity. In Yemen and Hejaz the predominance of the Maria 
Theresa thaler can be explained by the path dependency of currency usage. This currency had 
been pre-eminent so long that even government efforts could not dislodge it.23 Finally, as seen 
in more detail below, the failure to establish fiat money as a medium of exchange reinforced 
the dominance of diverse silver currencies throughout Ottoman lands.                              
2.2. Fiat money: from state notes to bank notes  
So far the discussion has covered only the coinage system and policy. However, the 
extent of commodity money cannot be assessed without considering fiat money. After the 
monetary reform of 1844 had ruled out debasements, the government unprecedentedly issued 
a state note (kaime). The earliest examples of these notes were handwritten documents issued 
in denominations of 500 kuruş (circa £4.5). As they carried an interest rate and had a maturity 
term, they were not “fiat currency” in the strict sense. However, the government declared 
repeatedly that the kaime was issued only in order to facilitate commerce and that it should be 
accepted as legal tender, exactly like gold and silver coins. It also announced that these notes 
would be accepted by tax collectors in the provinces and by the Treasury in Istanbul. Later, 
smaller denominations followed so as to increase their use in daily transactions and, with their 
limited volume, these notes performed reasonably well until 1852.24 From 1853 to 1862, 
however, government issued large quantities of non-interest bearing and unbacked notes to 
finance extraordinary state expenditures, which eventually led to heavy depreciation and 
inflation.25 In order to solve the problem in 1863 the government decided to withdraw all the 
                                                          
23 In 1888 a commission was assembled to consider a method of freeing Yemen of Maria Theresa thalers 
and supplanting them with silver mecidiyes. However, in practice it was not possible to refuse the Maria-
Theresa thalers in payment of taxes, since the local population had been accustomed for many years to 
employ these coins as their only medium of exchange. As a contemporary observer puts it, “the head of 
Maria Theresa impressed on the coin represents some sacred and mystic sign, conferring special value on 
the silver stamped with it” (Tuncer 2011, p.103). For detailed discussions of the case of Maria Theresa 
thaler, see A. Kuroda, “The Maria Theresa Dollar in the Early Twentieth-Century Red Sea Region: A 
Complementary Interface between Multiple Markets”, Financial History Review 14, no. 01 (2007); A. E. 
Tschoegl, “Maria Theresa's Thaler: A Case of International Money”, Eastern Economic Journal 27, no. 4 
(2001). 
24 A. Akyıldız, Osmanlı finans sisteminde dönüm noktası - Kağıt para ve sosyo-ekonomik etkileri (Istanbul, 
1996) and Pamuk, 2000, p.209-210.  
25 In the meantime, in 1854, the Ottoman government contracted its first foreign loan. This development 
reduced the dependency on domestic markets for financing its expenditures. Therefore, it was no 
coincidence that the government took the “paper money” experience to the next level.  
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current kaimes in circulation with the help of short-term loans from the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
(IOB).  
This was the beginning of a new era in the history of credit money in the Ottoman 
Empire. Henceforward, the IOB would act as the “central bank of issue” in addition to its 
commercial operations.26 It handled most of the transactions of the state treasury and had to 
provide short-term advances to the state. In return, the IOB had the exclusive privilege of issuing 
gold-convertible banknotes; and the government promised to maintain this exclusivity and not 
to issue state notes. The decree foresaw that the payment for the IOB notes would be 
demandable only in Istanbul, the place of issue. It also imposed a one-third reserve requirement 
on their issue.27  
Once all state notes were withdrawn from circulation, however, the IOB could  not 
easily increase its circulation. Before 1876, the total notes issued did not exceed 350,000 liras 
and the cover ratio never fell below 100 per cent. One reason for the low level of circulation 
was previous unsuccessful kaime experiments, which discouraged people from holding fiat 
money. Moreover, in transferring the monopoly of issue to a foreign commercial bank, the 
government found it harder to implement “forced circulation”. Given that the IOB was the 
major intermediary between international capital markets and the Ottoman government, the 
government’s unilateral suspension of privileges could have led to disruptions in foreign capital 
flows.  
The financial crisis of 1873 was a watershed, after which overseas lending declined. In 
consequence, the Ottoman government, together with a few other heavily indebted peripheral 
countries, declared in 1876 a moratorium on their outstanding debt. Meanwhile, with the 
sudden collapse of Ottoman credit in the European financial markets and the effect of war with 
Russia, the government abolished its previous engagement with the IOB on the issuing of its 
own notes. The new silver-backed state notes bore the seals of both the Treasury and the IOB 
and could thus be easily differentiated from the gold-backed notes of the IOB.28 Being already in 
default and on the point of war with Russia, the government could more easily take the risk of 
suspending the privileges of the IOB and issuing its own notes. From August 1876 to May 1878, 
the state notes in circulation reached a nominal value of 16 million liras and lost much value 
against all other exchanges. In February 1879, the government started negotiating a foreign 
                                                          
26 It should be noted that, unlike many other members of the core and peripheries of the time, there were 
no other private issue banks in the empire before (or even after) the foundation of the IOB. 
27 E. Eldem, A History of the Ottoman Bank, (Istanbul, 1999), p.463-466; A. Autheman, The Imperial 
Ottoman Bank (Istanbul, 2002); The Concession: ‘Reglement’ and Statutes of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 
1875, Guildhall Library, MS-23963; Eldem, 1999, pp.463-466. 
28 Akyıldız, 1996, pp.96-98; Eldem, 1999, p.465. 
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loan to allow its notes to be withdrawn and promised to redeem them at 1 gold lira for 400 
kuruş kaime – as opposed to the initial rate of 1 gold lira for 100 kuruş kaime.  
After the monetary reform of 1880, the IOB resumed its monopoly on issuing gold-
backed banknotes. Until 1914, IOB notes remained the only legal tender fiat money, circulating 
together with the gold and silver coins. After the reform, the amount of IOB notes in circulation 
increased steadily. Although the cover ratio was still much above the required rate of 30 per 
cent, in 1893 the government imposed an upper limit on the banknote issue of 1,5 million liras. 
The following year the bank gradually increased the circulation of its notes, which reached 1.4 
million liras by 1905. In 1908, following lengthy negotiations with the government, the IOB was 
finally authorised to increase the issue limit to 2 million liras. However, the total in circulation 
stabilised at around 1 million liras until August 1914. Perhaps more remarkably, throughout the 
period the cover ratio remained much above the officially required rate, suggesting that the 
bank could not increase the circulation of its notes even if it met all the legal requirements (see 
Chart 2). 
2.3. The Ottoman monetary system from 1880 to 1914 
From 1880 to 1914, the Ottoman Empire successfully adopted the gold standard and 
the monetary authority sustained the full convertibility of its gold-backed banknotes. However, 
closer scrutiny of the prevailing monetary activities and regulations reveals peculiarities in the 
functioning of this monetary standard.  
Regarding commodity money, the domestic circulation of gold coins was considerably 
limited. In fact, although the mint output of gold was fairly high, according to contemporaries, 
gold was never circulated. Any gold brought into the country, or struck by the mint, would 
“rapidly disappear”.29 In accordance with “Gresham’s law”, this resulted from past reductions 
in the legal value of the currencies to their intrinsic value and the government’s refusal to 
recognise its own paper money. As a result, gold was considered the only medium of exchange 
that still maintained its reputation as a store of value. In Istanbul, exchange rates were stable 
between the Ottoman currency and the currencies of other gold standard countries, but in the 
provinces of the empire, territorial exchange rates and currency zones survived throughout the 
period. Since domestic transactions used many different types of silver coins, the state in its 
operations had still to accept unlimited amounts of silver. Most of the silver in circulation carried 
                                                          
29 Quinquennial report of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, (1882-1887), 1888, London, pp.33. 
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high nominal value, which in the end led the fractional coinage to circulate at par, despite 
heavy depreciation in the international price of silver.30 
Regarding fiat money, the most distinguishing characteristic of the Ottoman monetary 
system was the limited circulation of gold-convertible banknotes. A closer look at the 
composition of the empire’s money stock for the period reveals that on average the share of 
gold-backed banknotes issued by the IOB was below 3 per cent of the total. In this respect, the 
Ottoman Empire was clearly an outlier compared to the other European gold standard countries 
(see Chart 3). Besides the legal restrictions on issuing banknotes, other factors explain their 
limited circulation. First and most important, the IOB was not a “national” but a commercial 
bank established by foreign capital and privileged to issue bank notes. This fact alone prevented 
the IOB (and the government) from implementing “forced circulation”; instead, all banknotes 
circulated on a “voluntary” basis and their volume was determined by demand. Second, the IOB 
started its operations inauspiciously. The previous fiat money issued by the government had 
already lost credibility, for the public preferred coins to notes. Another limitation was the policy 
of the IOB to redeem and convert its notes into gold only in Istanbul. In the provinces, the 
holders of these banknotes would use them like bills of exchange and send to Istanbul to 
convert them, which increased transaction costs. Moreover, the high denominations of the 
banknotes contributed to their limited circulation. Although a small volume of 2 lira banknotes 
were circulated in 1869, most of the IOB notes were nominally for 5 liras (around £4.5) making 
them inconvenient be used widely except for large transactions. Thus, because of both the 
unique characteristics of Ottoman monetary institutions and the reasons cited above, the notes 
circulated mostly in Istanbul, forming only a fraction of the total money stock.  
Overall, as the monetary base of the country continued to rely on silver rather than gold 
or gold convertible bank notes, the silver currency may fairly be said to have served as fiduciary 
money, with only a limited connection to its intrinsic value. From the government’s perspective, 
this monetary system, despite enforcement problems and defects in the monetary legislation, 
can be characterised by flexibility and pragmatism. As one contemporary observer puts it, the 
Ottoman monetary regime represented “an object-lesson of a silver-using country on a gold 
basis”.31 Indeed, from 1873 to 1881 when the Ottoman government faced insolvency, the 
minting of silver relative to gold soon increased, but this reversed after 1881 with conditions in 
international financial markets favouring the Ottoman government.32 Hence, the duality of the 
                                                          
30 This phenomenon is in line with the arguments of T. J. Sargent and F. R. Velde The Big Problem of 
Small Change, (Princeton, 2003). 
31 Annual Report of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, 1894, London, No. 12, pp.62-65. 
32 These favourable conditions were mostly due to surrendering certain tax revenues to creditors, i.e. 
establishing the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. See Tuncer, 2011.   
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Ottoman monetary system (i.e. silver for domestic transactions and gold for international 
transactions) and its accessibility to international financial markets were major determinants of 
commodity money’s dominance throughout the period. 
To conclude, the extraordinary aspects of the monetary system had important 
implications for monetary sovereignty. Unlike most of the major gold standard countries, the 
Ottoman Empire did not enjoy the “contingency clause” of the gold standard, which, by 
suspending gold convertibility and issuing notes, would have given the government some 
flexibility in financing budget deficits in cases of emergency, such as war.33 In this regard, its 
privileges gave the IOB independence in reaching decisions and the government gave up its 
access to a major monetary policy instrument. In the next section the consistency and 
applicability of these findings are checked in the European context. 
 
3. Measuring monetary sovereignty: data and analysis  
In this section we go beyond single-country analysis and compare the Ottoman Empire 
with the major players in the European gold standard. The main purpose is to see whether 
monetary sovereignty between countries differed and whether the Ottoman Empire was 
exceptional in this regard. First, a TSCS dataset consisting of 16 European countries over the 
period 1880-1913 is introduced, with hypotheses. In the second section, we move to 
econometric analysis based on a PCSE model and discuss the findings.  
3.1. Data and hypotheses 
In order to establish changing levels of monetary sovereignty and its determinants across 
Europe, a large new data set for 16 countries from 1880-1913 is gathered. In compiling it we 
relied on various primary and secondary sources. First, estimates of commodity money stocks 
and annual gross/net coinages of major European mints for relevant period were constructed by 
using annual mint, currency and treasury reports published by the UK and US. This primary 
dataset is combined with the Ottoman and Greek macroeconomic and monetary statistics in 
                                                          
33 M.D. Bordo and F. E. Kydland “The Gold Standard as a Rule: An Essay in Exploration”, Exploration in 
Economic History, v.32, (1995) p.423-464, M.D. Bordo and Schwartz, A. J. “The Specie Standard as a 
Contingent Rule: Some Evidence for Core and Peripheral Countries, 1880-1990”, NBER Working Papers 
(1997). M.D. Bordo, M. D. and Rockoff, H. “The Gold Standard as a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of 
Approval'”, The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 02 (1996), pp. 389-428. 
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Tuncer (2011) and with those for other European countries published in Flandreau and Zumer 
(2004) and Banks (2011).34  
The country sample consists of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK. The choice of countries is largely determined by two factors: the 
research question and the data availability. Regarding the latter, it would be ideal to include 
more peripheral countries in order to draw parallels with the Ottoman case. However, given 
data quality, this exclusion does not lead to a major problem, since European countries provide 
a more intuitive and contrasting framework for understanding the Ottoman gold standard and 
its anomalies.  
The commodity-fiat currency composition of the money stock is used as the main 
indicator of changing degrees of monetary sovereignty, assuming that a higher share of fiat 
currency represents greater flexibility for the government in determining the size and 
composition of the total money stock. This interpretation accords with the extensive literature 
on the determinants of seigniorage and competitive seigniorage within monetary unions, where 
monetary sovereignty is usually approximated by the ability of a government to change the size 
and composition of its monetary base.35 Therefore, in the data analysis, the share of fiat money 
in the total money stock becomes a dependent variable, i.e. a measure of varying degrees of 
monetary sovereignty. In estimating the total commodity money stock, first total annual net 
coinages for each country are calculated and then these figures are combined with existing 
estimates of total commodity money stock figures for gold, silver and notes issued by monetary 
authorities across Europe (see Charts 4a and 4b). 
                                                          
34 Unless otherwise indicated any data regarding the Ottoman Empire and Greece are from Tuncer (2011). 
For the remaining countries gold and silver stock is calculated by using the UK Annual Report of the 
Deputy Master and Comptroller of the Mint (1880-1914), London; US Annual Report of the Secretary of 
the Treasury on the State of the Finances (1880-1914), Washington; and Annual Report of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (1880-1914), Washington. All other indicators are from M. Flandreau and F. 
Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880–1913 (Paris, 2004) see http://eh.net/databases/Finance/ 
(accessed on 25/05/2012) Banks, Arthur S. 2011. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, Databanks 
International, Jerusalem, Israel; see http://www.databanksinternational.com (accessed on 25/05/2012).  
35 S. Fischer, (1982) “Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money,” Journal of Political Economy 90, 
295-313; R. Click, “Seigniorage in a Cross-Section of Countries”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
(1998), pp. 154-171; M. Bordo and A. Redish, “Maximizing Seigniorage Revenue during Temporary 
Suspensions of Convertibility: A Note” Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), 
pp. 157-168; M. Bordo and L. Jonung, “The Future of Emu: What Does the History of Monetary Unions 
Tell Us?”, NBER Working Papers (1999); R. A. Mundell “Monetary Unions and the Problem of 
Sovereignty”. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 579, no. 1 (2002), pp. 
123-152; N. G. Mankiw, “The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics 20, no. 2 (1987), pp. 327-341.  
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Regarding the control variables, the first point to explore is the effect of macroeconomic 
indicators, more specifically of central government’s ability to tax, the fiscal burden of foreign 
public debt, volume of international trade and bank reserves and finally gold and silver 
production. As the preceding section shows, for the Ottoman Empire the monetary system 
featured the use of fiat and commodity monies in different sectors. Therefore one of the 
hypotheses to test is the impact of international trade volume on the share of notes in 
circulation. We expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive as an indication of increasing 
money demand, thus leading to a positive change in the share of notes. The inclusion of central 
government revenue and public debt service into the model is justified by a parallel literature on 
fiscal dominance, i.e. whether or not the budget deficits condition the relative share of notes in 
total circulation.36 Although our analysis does not directly address questions from this literature, 
by controlling for government revenue and the important component of government 
expenditure, it is expected to take into account the fiscal pressure on note issue. In addition to 
fiscal indicators, we also include the reserves of the central issue bank as a positive determinant 
of bank note issue. Production figures of gold and silver are included in order to control for 
countries with extensive mining industries. It is expected that increased gold production for a 
specific country will have a positive impact on note circulation, due to cover restrictions. 
However, silver, in line with our arguments in the Ottoman case where silver became a fiduciary 
currency under the conditions of limited note circulation, is expected to have a negative 
relationship as long as the country is on the gold standard.37 Finally, in order to eliminate any 
omitted variable bias and collinearity, all above-mentioned macroeconomic variables enter the 
model in log-transformed per capita and British pounds terms. 
In addition to these macroeconomic indicators, an important factor to control is the 
difference between monetary institutions, more specifically the rules, which regulate the 
relationship between governments and issue banks. In Section 3 this is underlined as a major 
point in explaining the limited circulation of bank notes in the Ottoman Empire, where the 
relatively “independent” status of the Imperial Ottoman Bank from government eliminated the 
pressure on the bank, thus restricting the note issue. However, it is problematic to test this 
hypothesis for 16 different countries by simply including institutional dummy variables into our 
econometric model, given that the government control over issue banks varied across countries 
and involved different components. Therefore, a score-based measure of de jure control of each 
                                                          
36 M. Fratianni, “Fiscal Dominance and Money Growth in Italy: The Long Record”, Explorations in 
Economic History 38, no. 2 (2001), pp. 252-272; M. D. Gadea and et al., “Beating Fiscal Dominance. The 
Case of Spain, 1874-1998”, University of Zaragoza Working Paper (2008). O. J. Blanchard “Fiscal 
Dominance and Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Brazil”, NBER Working Paper, 2004.   
37 R. H. Ridgway, “Summarized Data of Gold Production”, US Department of Commerce Bureau of Mines 
Economic Paper, No.6, 1929; and C. W. Merrill, “Summarized Data of Silver Production”, US Department 
of Commerce Bureau of Mines Economic Paper, No.8, 1930.  
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government over issue banks is calculated, ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate 
stronger government control over the issue bank. This index, inspired by Flandreau et al (1998), 
incorporates a set of regulatory indicators including the legal status of the issue bank, 
government’s control over the appointment of its head and managing council, the bank’s 
obligations to provide statutory advances to the government or statutory issues on government 
securities, ownership of the bank’s profits, existence of a monopoly on issue and finally the role 
of the bank as a state’s treasurer.38 For a given country, each of these components is assigned a 
stepwise score between 0 and 1, which then are averaged to reach the final number. Moreover, 
any change in these indicators throughout the period is taken into account; however, with a 
few exceptions, the “issue bank independence index” (hereafter BANK index) does not show 
variation for a given country between 1880 and 1913. Evidently, quantifying a complex political 
economy relationship between governments and issue banks is not straightforward and cannot 
be reduced to a single number, but the results summarized in Chart 5 represent convenient 
averages for the econometric analysis and do not contradict the prevailing understanding of 
issue banks of the time. With the dataset and main hypotheses in place, the next section 
presents the econometric model and its findings.  
3.2. Analysis and results 
A TSCS dataset with these characteristics presents challenges for modelling the research 
question. The time period in question is long enough to show unit-root, trending and 
autoregressive characteristics, but is not long enough to implement a comprehensive time series 
analysis. Moreover, it would be against the nature of the research questions of this paper to 
implement 16 different time series analyses and compare the results in pursuit of an answer. As 
regards the panel data methods, having a relatively small number of units (countries) makes it 
hard to employ conventional analytical methods. A panel data regression with country fixed 
effects would pose problems since major explanatory variables such as BANK index and annual 
mining figures show little variation across time but greater variation across countries. Finally, 
besides these methodological issues, in purely econometric terms a simple random effects 
model shows serial and contemporaneous correlation of errors (errors in country i at time t 
being correlated with errors in country j at time t) and groupwise heteroskedasticity, according 
                                                          
38 M. Flandreau et al., “Stability without a Pact? Lessons from the European Gold Standard, 1880-1914”, 
Economic Policy 13, no. 26 (1998), pp. 117-162. For information on individual issue banks, see G. 
François Les Banques D’Emission (Paris, 1896); E. Servais Banques D’Emission – Banques Etrangères, 
Banque de France, Banques Coloniales (Paris, 1911); R. G. Levy, Banques D’Emission et Tresors Publics 
(Paris, 1911); C. Conant, A History of the Modern Banks of Issue (New York, 1927). For the Ottoman 
Empire and Greece, we rely on Tuncer (2011).  
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to the results of a Wooldridge test, Breusch-Pagan test and modified Wald test in turn, thus 
violating the basic assumptions of an OLS regression.39  
Therefore, following the convention in the literature, in the analysis below, to address 
these characteristics of our TSCS dataset, we use a Prais-Winsten regression with a panel-
specific autoregressive disturbance structure of AR(1).40 This approach, also known as the panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) model, retains OLS parameter estimators, but replaces OLS 
standard errors by panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs), which take into account the 
contemporaneous correlation of the errors and groupwise heteroskedasticity, though not serial 
correlation. Given that the Wooldridge test against the null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
indicates that the data have first-order autocorrelation, we must consider alternative solutions 
to this problem. One way of tackling it is to include lagged dependent variable in the right- 
hand side of the equation, but the literature suggests that this method, despite its superiority in 
terms of consistency, may absorb large parts of the trend and may be biased upwards, while 
the coefficients of the other independent variables are likely to be biased downwards. If a 
lagged dependent variable is not included, however, the serial correlation of the residuals 
increases with less weight on the autoregressive process and OLS estimates become inefficient. 
To address this problem and eliminate the serial correlation of errors, we combine panel-
corrected standard errors with a Prais-Winsten regression of AR(1) process for each unit. Finally, 
it is still essential to question the need to include time and/or unit dummies. Given that the 
question and hypotheses of the paper primarily address variation across countries for a given 
                                                          
39 N. Beck and J. Katz, “What to do (and not to do) with time series cross-section data”, American 
Political Science Review 89(3): 634–647, 1995; N. Beck and J. Katz, “Nuisance versus substance: 
Specifying and estimating time-series cross-section models”, Political Analysis 6(1): 1–36, 1996; N. Beck,  
“Time-series cross-section data: What have we learned in the past few years?”, Annual Review of Political 
Science 4: 271–293, 2001. 
40 Beck 2001; T. Plümper et al. “Panel Data Analysis in Comparative Politics: Linking Method to Theory”, 
European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 2 (2005), pp. 327-354; B. Kittel and H. Winner, “How 
Reliable Is Pooled Analysis in Political Economy? The Globalization & Welfare State Nexus Revisited”, 
European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 2 (2005), pp. 269-293; J. Wooldridge (2010) Econometric 
Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data”, MIT Press Books (2010). In order to address these 
characteristics of our data set, we also considered employing a fixed effect vector decomposition model. 
However, given the on-going discussion on the reliability of this approach in the case of time invariant 
variables, we preferred not to include the results here. See T. Plümper and V. E. Troeger, “Efficient 
Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit 
Fixed Effects”, Political Analysis 15, no. 2 (2007), pp. 124-139. W. Greene “Fixed Effects Vector 
Decomposition: A Magical Solution to the Problem of Time-Invariant Variables in Fixed Effects Models?”, 
Political Analysis 19, no. 2 (2011), pp. 135-146. T. Breusch, M. B. Ward, H. T. M. Nguyen and T. Kompas, 
“On the Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition”, Political Analysis 19, no. 2 (2011), pp. 123-134. N. Beck, 
“Of Fixed-Effects and Time-Invariant Variables”, Political Analysis 19, no. 2 (2011), pp. 119-122. 
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period and not variation over time for a given country, we also run our model with time fixed 
effects.41  
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 4, where we run our baseline 
PCSE-AR (1) regression in standardized beta coefficients with time fixed effects (model 1-3) and 
without (model 4-6). The inclusion of these effects, however, does not seem to improve the 
results significantly. Overall, perhaps the most striking finding is the highly significant and 
relatively high coefficient of the BANK index, which suggests that the differences in monetary 
sovereignty and the extent of notes in circulation in the total stock of money are largely 
determined by regulations related to the issue banks in any given country.  
In addition to institutional factors, trade volume and reserves are positively linked with 
the dependent variable, suggesting that countries with higher reserves enjoyed greater flexibility 
in introducing fiat money. Moreover, any increase in trade volume on average meant an 
increase in the share of total fiat money in circulation. As far as the fiscal indicators go, state 
revenues and debt service have correct signs and significance. These results suggest that central 
governments which were able to extract on average more tax per capita did not apply forced 
circulation, whereas higher burdens of interest service on public debt meant greater upward 
pressure on bank note issue. Finally, although the coefficients of gold and silver production 
seem to have the correct signs, they do not seem to be significant. This may be explained by the 
fact that no country in our sample was a major producer of gold and silver to the extent of 
noticeable differences in circulation levels. Overall results are useful for putting the major 
anomalies of the Ottoman gold standard into the European context, suggesting that the extent 
of fiat money in circulation was largely determined by government control over issue banks.  
The final section discusses the implications of these finding.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The main emphasis of this study is that the transition to fiat currency did not take place 
in all Europe similarly. Some countries relied relatively more heavily on commodity money and 
others more on fiat money. It has been suggested that under a fixed exchange rate regime and 
free capital flows, these differences in the components of monetary stock could imply changing 
degrees of monetary sovereignty, i.e. the ability to determine the size and composition of 
monetary stock in response to shocks and imbalances.  
                                                          
41 However, including country fixed effects would make the whole exercise redundant, as it would be 
impossible to test the significance of the institutional independent variable BANK index, which does not 
vary across time. 
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In pursuing this argument, our methodology was to move from a case study which 
challenges our conventional interpretation of the gold standard, to a broader set of countries. 
We showed that in the Ottoman Empire the domestic circulation of gold coins and bank notes 
were severely limited despite being on the gold standard. We also argued that the reasons 
behind the limited circulation of bank notes were mostly institutional, preventing the 
government from implementing “forced circulation”. Consequently, unlike most of the gold 
standard countries, the Ottoman Empire did not enjoy the “contingency clause” of the gold 
standard, which would have given the government some flexibility to finance budget deficits in 
an emergency, say, war, by suspending gold convertibility and issuing fiat currency. As a result, 
a multitude of silver coins circulating with limited connection to their intrinsic value, leading 
territorial exchange rates and currency zones replaced the absent fiat currency. 
The econometric analysis strengthens these results by suggesting that institutional 
framework, strong reserve position and trade volume may be important determinants of the 
extent of reliance on fiat money. Moreover, a strong central government, which can collect 
higher per capita tax revenue, faced less fiscal pressure to increase its share of notes in total 
circulation. Conversely, governments with heavy debts to service were more inclined to apply 
note issue. Thus, monetary sovereignty or extensive issuance of fiat money in the context of the 
gold standard could indicate both macroeconomic weakness and strength. Central 
governments facing less fiscal pressure did not have to apply “forced circulation”. However, 
increased money demand could result in a “voluntary” increase in note circulation. Besides 
these macroeconomic factors, perhaps the greatest determinant of differences between 
countries in monetary sovereignty was the institutions regulating the relationship between issue 
banks and governments. 
Overall in this paper the focus has been on explaining the reasons behind the variation 
in monetary sovereignty rather than discussing its consequences, which may be the subject of 
future research. By relying on the existing literature, however, it would not be wrong to 
speculate that those countries, which relied on notes more extensively, enjoyed greater 
flexibility in dealing with budgetary difficulties -leaving aside the negative consequences. Yet 
being unable to issue notes helped to reduce the credit risk but also access to capital markets, 
thus increasing foreign debt levels, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire.  
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Chart 1: Coins struck at the Ottoman Mint 
 
 
Sources: H. Ferid, Osmanlıda Para ve Finansal Kredi. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı ve Darphane Genel Müdürlüğü, 
(Istanbul, 1914). 
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Chart 2: Bank notes in circulation and cover ratio 
 
 
Sources: The Balance Sheets and Reports of the Ottoman Bank (1863-1914); E. Eldem, A History 
of the Ottoman Bank, (Istanbul, 1999). 
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Chart 3: Money stock and its components 1880-1913 
 
 
Average stock of gold, silver and notes for 1880-1913. For a detailed description of the sources see 
Footnote 36. 
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Chart 4a: Total coinage and note issue 
 
 
Sources and notes: The re-coinages are eliminated from the gross coinage figures. During this period, mints of the 
core countries also provided the service of minting for various other peripheral countries, which are also eliminated 
from these figures. See Footnote 36 for references.  
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Chart 4b: Note circulation as a % of total money stock 1880-
1913 
 
 
 
Sources: See Footnote 36. 
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Chart 5: Government legal control over issue bank 1880-1913 
 
 
 
Sources: See Footnote 40. 
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Table 1: Summary of monetary systems and currency in 
circulation, 1844-1914 
 
Year Monetary system Type of currency in 
circulation 
Monetary 
authorities 
1844 Bimetallism Gold coins 
Silver coins 
State notes 
Mint 
Treasury 
1863 Bimetallism Gold coins 
Silver coins 
Bank notes 
Mint 
IOB 
1876 Bimetallism Gold coins 
Silver coins 
State notes 
Bank notes 
Mint 
Treasury 
IOB 
1880 Limping standard Gold coins 
Silver coins 
Bank notes 
Mint 
IOB 
1914 Paper standard Gold coins 
Silver coins 
State notes 
Mint 
Treasury 
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Table 2: Coins struck: 1844-1914 
 
Year Weight (gr.) Fineness (%) Metallic Content (gr.) Mint Ratio 
1844    15.09 
Silver kuruş 1.2027 83 0.998  
Gold lira 7.216 91.67 6.614  
1880    15.88 
Silver kuruş 1.2027 83 0.998  
Gold lira 7.216 91.67 6.614  
1909    16.30 
Silver kuruş  1.2027 83 0.998  
Gold lira 7.216 91.67 6.614  
 
Sources: Tuncer, 2011; Kuyucak, 1947; Young, 1905; Eldem, 1999; Schneider, 1994. 
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Table 3: Exchange rates of lira and kuruş in several provinces, 
1883-1914 
 
Province 1883 1888 1889 1893 1905 1907 1914 
Adana      124  
Aleppo   125   127  
Beirut 123    124 124.6 124.6 
Baghdad    103.5 103   
Basra  148 153     
Damascus       130.8 
Edirne      123  
Homs       123 
Istanbul 108.3 109.1 109 108.6 108.4 108.2 108.7 
Izmir     178 125-178  
Jaffa      142  
Salonika 124     102.5  
Sidon       125 
Tripoli       124 
 
Sources: Tuncer, 2011; Schneider et al., 1994.  
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
Table 4. Results: Prais-Winsten regressions, correlated PCSEs with panel-specific AR(1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: In all cases the dependent variable is note circulation as a percentage of total money stock. All variables are log-transformed and the results are reported in standardised 
coefficients. Issue bank reserves (RES.PC), government revenue (REV.PC), interest service (IS.PC), trade volume (exports plus imports) (TRADE.PC) value of gold production (GOLD.PC) and 
value of silver production (SILVER.PC) are per capita figures in British pounds. Models (1) to (3) include time-fixed effects. Multicollinearity among the independent variables is checked by 
VIFs (variance inflation factors), which were less than 7 in all cases. Sources: see section 3. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                    
BANK 0.279*** 0.335*** 0.283*** 0.218*** 0.219*** 0.272*** 
 
(0.0411) (0.0433) (0.0396) (0.0320) (0.0354) (0.0383) 
RES.PC 0.157*** 0.170*** 0.130*** 0.169*** 0.131*** 0.159*** 
 
(0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0304) (0.0291) (0.0284) (0.0301) 
TRADE.PC 0.157*** 0.192*** 0.179*** 0.127*** 0.143*** 0.167*** 
 
(0.0433) (0.0456) (0.0410) (0.0381) (0.0430) (0.0341) 
REV.PC -0.0541** -0.0621*** -0.0388* -0.0455** -0.0566*** -0.0560*** 
 
(0.0225) (0.0234) (0.0231) (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0211) 
IS.PC 0.0443 0.0974** 0.0984*** 0.0314 0.0992*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.0347) (0.0385) (0.0351) (0.0337) (0.0318) (0.0369) 
GOLD.PC 0.00777 -0.0160 
 
-0.0212 
  
 
(0.0296) (0.0282) 
 
(0.0271) 
  SILVER.PC -0.000112 
  
-0.0233 -0.0374 
 
 
(0.0476) 
  
(0.0395) (0.0454) 
 D.YEAR Y Y Y N N N 
       Constant -0.343*** -0.416*** -0.334*** -0.0433 0.0361 -0.0720* 
 
(0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0458) (0.0356) (0.0375) (0.0398) 
       Observations 530 530 530 530 530 530 
R-squared 0.249 0.307 0.281 0.160 0.160 0.222 
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 
N 530 530 530 530 530 530 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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